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So far neither regulatory frameworks nor endeavours 
to develop bottom-up approaches to data protection 
have had much success in mitigating the moral hazard 
inherent in pervasive use of seemingly innocuous, 
“leaked data”. This paper focuses on two aspects of 
those risks that are too rarely discussed. They relate to 
the possibility of civic responsibility (1) and moral 
equality (2). 
 
(1) Ethical agency (and the responsibility it entails) 
presupposes the possibility of change: when our 
practices are wanting, someone needs to be able 
to stand up and question them. Change, in turn, 
presupposes the ability to break from habitual 
frames of thought. To what extent is the profile-
based tailoring of the environmental architecture 
that shapes our choices and attitudes hampering 
the possibility of civic responsibility? The 
question at stake here is different from the better-
known “right to be forgotten” issue: the latter 
focuses on the impact of recorded data on others’ 
perception of oneself. This paper, by contrast, 
focuses on what may be called the “anchoring 
effect”: the impact of recorded data on our ability 
to see the world -and, most importantly, our role 
in it- differently. The ability to acknowledge a 
discrepancy between one’s present ethical stand 
and the person one seeks to be is essential to 
making sense of any notion of civic 
responsibility. The danger is that such 
discrepancy will simply cease to arise in an 
environment that has been systematically 
“optimized” in accordance to one’s profile. 
 
(2) The second section of this paper explores the 
extent to which ubiquitous, proactive computing 
gives rise to a very particular type of 
vulnerability, one that potentially threatens the 
moral equality of data-subjects. This vulnerability 
cannot be addressed by correcting epistemic 
imbalances. The current regulatory focus on 
information disclosure has obscured what mere 
disclosure cannot achieve: empowering data-
subjects to maintain and develop their sense of 
self. This may sound overly ambitious. I argue 
that it is no more so than a commitment to retain 





 Keywords – Pervasive data profiling, ubiquitous 







































Imagine a seemingly ideal scenario, whereby policy-
makers and software engineers have managed to 
collaborate in such a way as to seamlessly integrate both 
privacy concerns and transparency imperatives within the 
ongoing deployment of “smart” applications. The latter are 
designed to simplify or replace altogether our practical 
reasoning in both mundane (food choices, task 
prioritisation) and specialised contexts (professional 
applications): 
 
 “It’s the end of a successful day for Ben: he’s 
contributed to fine-tuning a `virtual GP app’ which has 
today been approved for nationwide deployment: millions 
of patients will now be able to “consult” a virtual GP as 
and when needed, thus simultaneously increasing 
accessibility and cutting costs while delivering more 
reliable and accurate services. Ben is sitting in the tube 
taking him home –it’s packed, but he’s glad his commuting 
app recommended he leave his bike at work, as a large 
demonstration is taking place on his way home - something 
to do with euthanasia legislation. His “PA bot” interrupts 
his reading about it as a message comes in notifying Ben 
that he has not been selected for the job he applied for last 
week. Ben taps on the feedback button. In it he finds an 
ordered list of all the parameters taken into account. His 
PA is busy correlating those parameters to all the data that 
is likely to have been fed into the automated hiring system. 
His PA system flags up an anger management course 
which Ben recently attended in the context of his current 
job. Although his course registration itself was 
confidential, Ben had chosen to discuss this course, and 
the value of anger as a moral emotion, in one of his blogs 
(while Ben had de-activated his PA). Anticipating Ben’s 
volatile emotional state, the PA bot starts Ben’s favourite 
“gym playlist”, which prompts Ben to leave the tube one 
stop earlier, for a detour via the gym (which means he will 
miss his kids’ bedtime routine). The PA also messages 
several of Ben’s friends who are scheduled to be around 
and silences several of his wife’s increasingly irritated 
messages while planning for a bunch of flowers to be 
delivered to her in a couple of hours.” 
 
The above scenario is not science-fiction. True, we don’t 
have virtual GPs yet –only video app consultations, with 
real GPs (if the instrumental logic that currently presides 
over fast growing professional automation has its way, it’s 
only a matter of time). While travel optimisation apps are 
already with us, “PA bots” are on their way. All the 
applications deployed in the proposed scenario come with 
substantial privacy challenges. 
 
Now let’s imagine that, somehow, the infrastructure that is 
in place is robust enough to make sure that both the 
collection and processing of data (whether it is deemed 
“personal” or not) is transparent to all in its process, while 
its content remains rigorously opaque outside the 
applications it is meant for. Whether one considers the data 
collected (and relied on) during virtual GP consultations, 
or the data that enables Tom’s PA to anticipate his desires 
or preferences, the assumption is that this data is both 
collected and processed in a transparent and accountable 
way. The algorithms that allow Tom’s PA to infer future 
desires (and behaviour) from patterns identified in real 
time within his machine-readable behaviour are publicly 
accessible, as are those that preside over virtual GP 
consultations. Any form of data collection must be 
consented to, with adequate, individual guidance on both 
short and long-term implications. Imagine, in short, that 
the information asymmetry between data-controllers and 
data-subjects is successfully controlled and mitigated. 
Enlightened collaborative efforts between public policy 
makers and software engineers mean that a series of 
safeguards are constantly in the process of being built into 
the data processing algorithms, which are subject to regular 
checks and assessments (and can be audited by members of 
the public at any time). 
 
As desirable as it may be, the above scenario is only apt to 
address (and remedy) one particular form of vulnerability: 
that which derives from epistemic inequality. Given the 
extent to which the deployment of smart technologies 
cannot but massively amplify the impact of pre-existing 
epistemic inequalities, it is both unsurprising and necessary 
that one should seek to address newly created knowledge 
asymmetries. If the latter were amplified tenfold by the 
advent of the script, they are probably magnified a 
thousand-fold by the advent of ubiquitous computing 
(Weiser, 1995). Yet the danger is to let this -laudable- 
concern for epistemic equality obscure other forms of 
equality, which are less visibly endangered by the 
deployment of smart technologies in our quotidian lives.  
 
The second section of this paper explores the extent to 
which ubiquitous, proactive computing gives rise to a very 
particular type of vulnerability, one that potentially 
threatens the moral equality of data-subjects. This 
vulnerability cannot be addressed by correcting epistemic 
imbalances. The current regulatory focus on information 
disclosure has obscured what mere disclosure cannot 
achieve: empowering data-subjects to maintain and 
develop their sense of self. This may sound overly 
ambitious. I argue that it is no more so than a commitment 
to retain a meaningful, practice-relevant concept of civic 
responsibility.  
 
Civic responsibility presupposes an ability to acknowledge 
a discrepancy between one’s present ethical stand and the 
person one seeks to be. The danger is that such discrepancy 
 3 
will simply cease to arise in an environment that has been 
systematically “optimized” in accordance to one’s profile. 
The first section addresses the challenges raised by what I 
call the “anchoring effect”: the impact of recorded data on 
our ability to see the world -and, most importantly, our role 








1.1. Inferring future attitudes from our 
machine-readable past: a self-fulfilling 
prophecy? 
 
We have all learned to “profile” from a young age. Based 
on the past attitude or behavior of people with certain 
characteristics, we tend to expect people with those 
characteristics to behave in a certain way. Our expectations 
are often confounded: the “data sample” we base those 
expectations on are usually tiny, and most of us tend to be 
rather bad statisticians. That’s not only because we are 
susceptible to all sorts of heuristic biases. We are also 
prone to getting mixed up and treating rumors and 
apprehensions as if they were behavioral facts. 
 
Machines fare better. Increasingly sophisticated data 
collection technologies mean that machines can now 
“read” many aspects of the quotidian lives of a rapidly 
growing number of people. Combined with fast evolving 
data mining techniques, these large, expanding datasets 
allow for the discovery of statistically robust correlations 
between particular human traits, attitudes and behaviours. 
The tactical advantages -and considerable dangers- that 
stem from being able to leverage this newly generated 
knowledge for commercial or political purposes have been 
amply demonstrated this past year. 
 
My concern is with a different kind of peril. It is harder to 
pinpoint as its effects are slower to manifest themselves, 
and when they do it will be much too late for any 
democracy to be worthy of the name. This peril stems from 
the nascent, but fast developing art of harvesting “live” 
personal data to personalize digital services in real time. 
Far from being confined to recorded online behavior (or 
commercial / lifestyle preferences), this “live” personal 
data will include physiological indicators of nascent 
emotions. Combined with increasingly sophisticated 
profiles, the latter will enable smart applications to mold 
our perceived environment (and its offerings) to our 
anticipated desires and attitudes. This has dramatic 




1.2. Civic Responsibility and the possibility 
of moral change in an “onlife world” 
 
To make sense of ethical agency (and its concomitant 
responsibility) in a low-tech, “offline” world is hard 
enough. One of the key challenges for moral philosophy is 
indeed to explain what conditions our ability to take a 
moral stand against the usual or socially accepted. We now 
have ample empirical evidence suggesting that our ethical 
sensitivity (our ability to see how the world could be made 
better) is enabled by the habits of thought and action that 
we’ve acquired in the process of growing up. If ethical 
judgment is thoroughly culturally conditioned, where does 
anybody find the momentum necessary to standing back 
and questioning potentially abhorrent practices? 
 
The above question takes a dramatic turn -since acquired 
habits of evaluation are even more likely to “stick”- when 
raised in the context of a hypothetical “ambient 
intelligence environment”, which is best described by 
(Hildebrandt & Koops, 2010): 
 
“Ambient Intelligence is based on proactive computing 
meant to adapt your environment to your preferences 
before you become aware of them. It organises your life 
at a subliminal level by seamlessly catering to your 
needs and desires and thus providing you with 
personalised opportunities based on a calculated 
anticipation of what you would have preferred had you 
known what the smart environment ‘knows’”. 
 
While the real-time, calculated adaptation of our 
environment on the basis of what our profile suggests 
would best fit our upcoming preferences may be appealing 
in its comforting efficiency, it is also morally hazardous. 
Why? Because all will agree that, at some point or another, 
our ability to stand back and question commonly accepted 
practices requires some kind of trigger. The dawning 
awareness of an irresolvable discrepancy between the 
person one seeks to be and socially conditioned habits of 
evaluation requires precisely the kind of “friction” which 
any seamless, profile-based optimisation of our 






1.3.  “Counter profiling” confrontations? 
 
In keeping with the current focus on epistemic 
vulnerability when it comes to data protection and the 
implication of profiling practices, many emphasize the 
need to equip each data subject with an understanding of 
how her behavior may be interpreted by “ambient” 
algorithms. Along this line, (Hildebrandt & Koops, 2010) 
for instance call for: 
 
“autonomic profiling […] to be designed in such a way 
that it affords reasonably accurate anticipations of how a 
person is being and will be profiled. These anticipations 
must be as smooth, seamless, and subliminal as the 
smart environment itself, thus requiring novel types of 
human machine-interfaces that warn a person how her 
behaviour may be interpreted by the smart 
infrastructure”. 
 
This paper emphasizes the need to see beyond epistemic 
vulnerability, and take into account the impact of profiling 
practices upon the possibility of civic responsibility. 
Alerting the data subject to the profiling implications of 
her behavior is important, but it is unlikely to foster the 
openness to being called into question often required for 
the processes leading to moral change: “engineered 
encounters” with significantly different others, on the other 
hand, might. Designed so as to confront us with markedly 
different worldviews or lifestyles, such engineered 
encounters would leverage the knowledge inherent in 
profiling practices but reverse their purpose. For when it 
comes to awakening us from deeply entrenched habits, 
“mere” words are no match for the kind of encounter 
described in radical terms by Levinas1 when he refers to 
the “face of the Other” summoning each and every one of 
us. These encounters may be engineered through 
seemingly “random” encounters or they may be fabricated 
all the way through: fully immersive virtual environments 
are starting to be used for ethics training precisely because 
of their ability to mobilise “primitive”, emotional 
responses that do not necessarily come live in the nitty-
gritty of our personal or professional lives. 
 
 
2. Proactive computing and moral 
equality  
                                                
1 “The relation with the Other, or Conversation, is […] an ethical 
relation; but inasmuch as it is welcomed this conversation is a 
teaching. Teaching is not reducible to maieutics; it comes from 
the exterior and brings me more than I contain. In its non-violent 
transitivity the very epiphany of the face is produced.” (Levinas, 
1969, p. 51) 
 
It is relatively easy to see how existing knowledge 
asymmetries may be exacerbated in an environment that 
relies on systematic, personalised profiling to optimise our 
environment to our upcoming preferences. To claim that, 
beyond epistemic inequality, it is our commitment to moral 
equality that is most problematically imperilled by these 
emerging, “smart enviornments” may sound far-fetched.  
 
 
2.1. When epistemic inequality morphs into 
moral inequality 
 
“What infringes our privacy is that emotional states, 
which are mostly unconscious, may be picked up by our 
environment before we become aware of them. ‘They’ 
may thus ‘read’ our emotions before we have a chance 
to develop our own reflection and response to our own 
emotional state. This is decisive, because researchers 
like Damasio have shown a crucial the difference 
between feelings and emotions. Feelings emerge when 
humans become aware of their emotions. Feelings allow 
for and thrive on conscious attention to and reflection on 
one’s emotional responses. They enable us to develop a 
personality that is not entirely intuitive, not completely 
dependent on whatever emotion overwhelms us. 
Feelings integrate awareness, deliberation and interior 
monologue on our emotional habits. They thus enable us 
to grow and mature into the kind of person we want to 
be.” (Hildebrandt, 2015) 
 
In the above quote, that which ultimately “enable[s] us to 
grow and mature into the kind of person we want to be” is 
understood as falling under the umbrella of (widely 
defined) privacy concerns. This characterisation may well 
obscure the distinctiveness of what is at stake, which 
cannot be addressed by remedying epistemic imbalances, 
for in that scenario epistemic inequality effectively morphs 
into moral inequality. How so? Sangiovanni brilliantly 
articulates the conceptual link between the exploitation of 
another’s vulnerability and moral (in)equality via the 
notion of social cruelty. What makes it wrong to treat 
others as inferiors in a way that violates our equal status2 
is not some mysterious “value-bestowing capacity 
possessed to an equal extent by each one of us” (such as 
dignity) but rather a rejection of social cruelty. The latter is 
                                                
2 Clearly it is not the case that all forms of treating others as 
inferiors are wrong: social relationships are structured by all sorts 
of hierarchies that make it acceptable, or even expected, for 
someone to treat another as inferior. Some cases of treating 
another as inferior are wrong “merely” because they are unfair. 
Others are wrong in a more fundamental way. Sangiovanni argues 
that, instead of traditional (whether Christian or Kantian) 
references to dignity, a rejection of social cruelty does a better job 
at explaining our commitment to moral equality. 
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defined as “the unauthorized, harmful and wrongful use of 
another’s vulnerability to attack or obliterate their capacity 
to develop and maintain an integral sense of self” 
(Sangiovanni, 2017, p. 76). 
 
2.2. Personalised profiling and opacity 
respect 
 
Whether it be through stigmatisation or 
instrumentalisation, the seamless adaptation of our 
environment on the basis of our past, machine-readable 
behaviour provides fertile ground for inferiorising 
treatment that is wrong not because it violates some norm 
of fairness but rather because it threatens our unique ability 
to develop and maintain a sense of self. The latter is in part 
dependent upon the possibility of preserving a gap between 
the self that we present to the world and the self that we 
conceal. Maintaining such opacity is key to all sorts of 
role-based social practices. It is also what protects us 
against various forms of social cruelty: “the most 
systematic forms of social cruelty aim at breaking our 
sense of ourselves as self-presenting” (Sangiovanni, 2017, 
p. 83). The latter sense requires at least partial control over 
what is “inner” and what is “outer”. In the “ambient 
intelligence” environment described earlier, such control is 
at best illusory.  
 
One may seek to address the above concerns by 
engineering ways of actively seeking genuine and ongoing 
consent to pervasive, personalised profiling. One may 
argue that there is no fundamental, qualitative difference 
between such profiling practices and the way some of us 
are happy to relinquish some of our personal data in order 
to reap the benefits of time-saving (or entertaining) 
applications. If this line of argument is correct, and if the 
vulnerabilities at stake are indeed of the same kind, then 
the current regulatory focus on epistemic imbalances 
(whether it be through imposing transparency or 
explanatory constraints) is right: what matters is to find 
ways of actualising “genuine” and “ongoing” consent. Yet 
if, beyond the all too visible epistemic inequalities, it is our 
very ability to maintain and develop a sense of self that is 
called into question by the proactive computing described 
earlier, then the regulatory fixation with epistemic 
imbalances is wholly inadequate. In that case it is high 
time engineers and policy-makers start to grapple with 
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